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Bio-objects’ political capacity: 
a research agenda
Abstract  This article explores the merits of foregrounding 
the dichotomy of politicization vs de-politicization for our 
understanding of bio-objects in order to study their pro-
duction, circulation, and governance in European societies. 
By asking how bio-objects are configured in science, pol-
icy, public, and media discourses and practices, we focus 
on the role of socio-technical configurations in generating 
political relations. The bio-object thereby serves as an en-
try point to approach and conceptualize “the political” in 
an innovative way.
Drawing from our previous work, which uses the concepts 
of de-politicization and (re-)politicization, this paper puts 
forward a research agenda for studying the political rela-
tions generated by specific socio-technical configurations 
of bio-objects.
(De)PolItIcIzatIon anD DeMocracy
The dichotomy of politicization vs de-politicization origi-
nated as a response to the idea of the arrival of a “post-
ideological” era when the victory of capitalism and liberal 
democracy over its counterparts put forward the belief in a 
universal rational consensus, with experts reconciling con-
flicting interests and values through impartial procedures 
and technical knowledge (1-3). A specific school of politi-
cal philosophers (4-7) however have criticized this concep-
tualization as embodying not so much a “post-ideological,” 
but “post-political” and “post-democratic” condition. This 
implies that the essence of democratic politics, ie, the 
confrontation of hegemonic political projects, is aban-
doned in favor of a “de-politicized” technocratic man-
agement of social, economic, and ecological matters 
within the framework of an “inevitable” hegemonic neolib-
eral project and global market forces. In this process of “de-
politicization,” “the political” is transformed from a matter 
of ideological contestation to a matter of administration. 
Decision-making is no longer a question of political posi-
tion but of expert knowledge, thereby foreclosing a demo-
cratic struggle between alternative courses of action be-
yond the existing socio-political status-quo, and replacing 
it with technocratic decision-making and/or market forces. 
In this post-political condition, anyone who disagrees with 
this “consensus” is turned into a fundamentalist, tradition-
alist, or blind radical, through a moralization and rational-
ization of politics. This implies that the construction of the 
we/they opposition in political categories constitutive of 
democratic politics, is, respectively, replaced by the moral 
categories of “good” vs “evil,” or neutralized by striving for 
a consensus reached by “rational” argumentation between 
“rational” experts (5,8). Consequently, the dichotomy politi-
cization vs de-politicization serves as a framework for re-
vealing strategies of in- and exclusion, and more specifical-
ly, how processes of de-politicization separate legitimate 
actors, demands, discourses, and practices from illegiti-
mate actors, demands, discourses, and practices, exclud-
ing the latter from democratic debate. By addressing how 
specific “political relations” follow from the articulation/dis-
articulation of discourses and practices associated with the 
creation/abolition of selected institutions, this framework 
is primarily concerned with the hegemonic constitution of 
society. And more specifically, the role of power relations 
in the construction of particular forms of objectivity. Not 
only does this framework negate a view of politics as a set 
of supposedly technical moves and neutral procedures, it 
also reveals this view as a particular strategy to de-politi-
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cize and naturalize particular interests and power relations, 
exactly by disclosing the political nature and implications 
of supposedly technical moves and neutral procedures (9). 
Recently, previous work of the authors of this paper has ex-
posed the political implications of socio-technical configu-
rations of bio-objects in science, policy, public and media 
discourses, and practices by focusing on processes of po-
liticization and de-politicization.
(De)PolItIcIzatIon In PUBlIc anD MeDIa 
DIScoUrSeS on GenetIcally ManIPUlateD (GM) 
FooD
In the field of media sociology, recent framing and critical 
discourse analysis research on public and media discourses 
about GM food has demonstrated the extent to which this 
“bio-object” is the subject of struggles between processes 
of politicization and processes of de-politicization (10,11): 
de-politicizing discourses underpin the common problem 
definition with which GM food is approached in public 
and media discourses, successfully linking neoliberal dis-
courses to discourses of scientism and supporting the idea 
of the marketing of GM food as a normal element of an 
inevitable, natural scientific and economic development 
serving the public interest. As a consequence, democratic 
control (either on science or on markets) can be interpret-
ed as disruptive and counterproductive. This configuration 
naturalizes the development of GM food (and the associat-
ed technology) as scientific and economic progress, while 
objectifiying the interests of its developers and advocates 
as public interests. The consequences of these processes 
of naturalization and objectification are 2-fold: (A) any dis-
ruption of this natural process (eg, political debate, regu-
lation, direct action) is interpreted as damaging to scien-
tific and economic progress, and consequently the public 
interest, and (B) it can only be explained by factors exter-
nal to the technology or its developers (eg, flawed science, 
flawed scientists, sensational media, flawed PR-efforts, an 
emotional, fearful, ignorant public, etc) and by stigmatiz-
ing challengers (eg, as anti-science radicals, fundamental-
ists, green terrorists, neo-luddites, etc). The main discursive 
practice emanating from this configuration is the exclusive 
allocation of any epistemic authority (in terms of an un-
problematic notion of scientific consensus and discourses 
of “sound science”) to the developers/advocates of this bio-
object. In so doing, unacknowledged value-laden assump-
tions and material interests in the development of GM 
food are isolated, and the “sound science” of its developers 
is distinguished from the epistemically-vacuous concerns 
of whoever resists their risk definitions. The struggle is thus 
shifted from a politico-ideological debate about alterna-
tive technological futures to dichotomies such as science 
vs politics/ideology/fear, rationality vs emotionality, sound 
science vs junk science, etc – with the effect of delegiti-
mizing any space for democratic debate about alternative 
technological futures (10,11). This particular GMO configu-
ration therefore mainly works in the service of evacuating a 
democratic debate between competing, yet legitimate ac-
tors, with competing, yet legitimate, risk definitions. In ad-
dition democratic debate or political intervention is dele-
gitimized as not in the public interest.
On the other hand, discourses promoted mainly by social 
movements/NGOs were found to start from other underly-
ing, implicit problem definitions which regard technologi-
cal and economic developments not as “inevitable” or “nat-
ural” processes but as contested processes, whose direction 
is steered by specific agents with specific values, interests, 
and aspirations. The discursive practices emanating from 
these alternative problem definitions aimed at revealing 
the competing sets of assumptions, values, and interests, 
underlying opposing responses to scientific uncertainty 
(such as corporate control, financial interests, technologi-
cal progressivism, a large-scale, industrialized, energy- and 
capital-intensive agriculture, etc.) Therefore, a discursive 
space for approaching the development of GM food as a 
conflict between alternative technological (and econom-
ic) futures was created, making it the object of public ac-
countability, democratic debate, and political regulation. 
Social movements/NGOs were found to respond to the 
widespread de-politicizing discourses with (re-)politicizing 
discourses by framing the GM food controversy as a strug-
gle between conflicting – yet legitimately considered – al-
ternative futures proposed by conflicting – yet legitimately 
considered – actors. They promoted democratic debate in 
the face of heavy artillery by science organizations and cor-
porate associations who in the promotion of specific prod-
ucts (and their associated technology) preferred to frame 
GM food as a predefined matter belonging to the realm of 
technocratic decision-making and/or “free market” forces.
For instance, Syngenta’s campaign to promote the use of 
GM crops to tackle water scarcity illustrates this point. In 
their campaign, water scarcity is framed as a technical is-
sue, which paves the way for a technological solution (ie, 
GM crops). This approach obscured not only the whole ar-
ray of social, economic, and political factors which have 
resulted in the overuse and pollution of water, but also 
the role played by the very innovation regime of which 
Syngenta’ s strategy is a part. Syngenta´s campaign 
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is an example of how the framing of social, economic, and 
political problems in terms of technical questions aims at 
delegating essentially political decisions to expert com-
mittees, in order to divert responsibility from political ac-
tors to techno-scientific networks, while denying the rel-
evant normative/political dimensions (12-14).
FroM eVIDence-BaSeS to re-PolItIcIzatIon In 
InSUrance PractIceS anD FooD SaFety
Literature in the field of Science & Technology Studies (STS) 
has demonstrated the extent to which the promotion of a 
scientific technocratic approach in public policy serves as 
a de-politicizing strategy. This is visible in terms of the rise 
of experts, testing and monitoring activities, as well as the 
installation of guidelines and quality standards. The idea 
is created that scientific, “politically- neutral,” facts serve 
as a foundation for compromises and consensus in politi-
cal conflict. Scientific expertise and calculative technolo-
gies are used as anti-political devices in order to reduce 
the space of the political and de-politicize potentially con-
troversial issues (15-18). However, recent research on insur-
ance practices and food safety has illustrated how recur-
rent processes of de-politicization, instead of closing down 
the political may, become a source for re-politicization.
A widespread tendency to tackle “rationally” political issues 
such as rising health care costs or discriminatory practices 
in insurance results in the construction of “evidence-bases.” 
For example, Van Hoyweghen and Horstman (19) have in-
vestigated the “insurance talk” of risks, medical risk profiles, 
statistics, and “evidence-based underwriting.” They dem-
onstrate how the European insurance industry, in reaction 
to the public debate on the use of genetics in insurance, 
has explicitly reinforced its principle of “fair discrimination” 
based on “sound” actuarial science. Strategies of “Evidence-
Based Rating” (EBR) have been deployed in order to stress 
the scientific base of medical risk selection. These calcula-
tion devices are deployed to de-politicize contentious is-
sues such as the use of genetic information in insurance. 
This politics of calculation, instead of closing down the po-
litical, becomes a source of re- politicization (20). The strat-
egy of evidence-based underwriting was found to create 
particular expectations, making uncertainty in insurance 
underwriting more explicit than previously. Effectively, 
thus, the turns toward evidence-based underwriting stan-
dards and the intensification of calculation in insurance 
provokes new sources of politicization. In other words, 
insurance generates its own forms of failure and resis-
tance. The intensification of medico-actuarial invest-
ments makes it vulnerable to further interrogation and to 
possible politicization. While the intentions of evidence-
based underwriting strategies are to de-politicize the ge-
netics issue, its effects appear to be political (again). The 
evidence-based machinery intensifies insurance markets 
as scenes for political conflict. Insurance is a “regime of in-
clusion-exclusion” (21) par excellence and the recent turn 
toward measurement (and explicit “evidence-based” calcu-
lation) is likely to amplify this dimension even more.
Another illustrating example proceeds from the case of 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). In relation to 
food safety, the BSE or “mad cow disease” crisis was termed 
a crisis in the EU, and not just a (serious) problem to deal 
with, because food safety explicitly became the site of in-
tense political conflict. Confusion abounded as to who 
decided what within the European Commission. The lat-
ter was criticized of being an obscure body where politi-
cal interests and technical expertise (mainly British veteri-
narians) coincided. Scientific judgment about the risks of 
contamination was deemed to be contaminated itself by 
political interests. The EC had lost credibility and, above 
all, trust. To restore citizen’s and consumer’s trust, it was de-
cided to reconfigure the area of food policy. The European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was created to centralize sci-
entific expertise in Parma, removing it physically from deci-
sion-making bodies in Brussels. Food policy thus became 
a de-politicized mode of public intervention, where deci-
sion-making relied upon information obtained elsewhere 
through the scientific practice of risk assessment. Indeed, 
it was the principle of risk analysis, as originally proposed 
by the US National Research Council in the 1980s, that in-
spired European policy-makers to reform the area of food 
policy and create EFSA as a separate scientific agency (22). 
In an attempt to de-politicize the politics of risk, the princi-
ple of Risk Analysis separates risk assessment from risk man-
agement, the latter depending on the former to provide a 
politically “neutral” evidence-base for subsequent decision-
making. However, EFSA immediately became the target 
of critique, and new controversies proliferated again. The 
separation of scientific risk assessment from political risk 
management has not been able to prevent political con-
flicts around issues like GMOs, nutrition, and health claims, 
but it rather displaced and changed existing conflicts (23). 
For example, when EFSA was charged to scientifically as-
sess health claims on food products – a matter that was 
subject to rather loose national regulations before – the 
agency and its assessment scheme became an obligato-
ry reference point, not only for industry, but indirectly also 
for academic scientists researching the health benefits of 
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specific food compounds. A debate is currently going on 
about the scientific evidence needed to make such health 
claims about a food product. Implementing a particular 
version of evidence-based medicine (EBM), EFSA requires 
data from randomized, placebo-controlled clinical trials on 
healthy populations. Evidence on clinical endpoints related 
to disease is however not allowed, as the product would 
then be considered a “drug” and not a “food product.” This 
has triggered reactions and the formation of new groups 
defending their science, and not necessarily Science (with 
a capital) in general. These groups are not just new “stake-
holders” that claim to be concerned by a given, stable ob-
ject, but contesters, calling into question the meaning of 
“scientific proof” or the divide between food and medicine. 
They actively make propositions to enable food ingredi-
ents to develop new therapeutic relations and contest the 
techno-legal identity of the food, which becomes a bio-
object in the configuration of European food policy.
toWarD a reSearcH aGenDa: tranSlatIonS oF tHe 
PolItIcal
While de-politicization and (re-)politicization have been 
variously approached in the examples we discussed, they 
have in common that politicization represents the process 
of opening-out issues to disagreement, conflict, and al-
ternative framings (of socio-political relations). The role of 
technocratic, administrative, managerial, expert-led, and 
consensus-seeking approaches and procedures in fore-
closing processes of politicization is represented by the 
process of de-politicization. In this latter process, the rise 
of experts, testing and monitoring activities, the installa-
tion of guidelines and quality standards, the construction 
of evidence-bases as well as calculation devices, are put 
forward as supposedly technical moves and neutral pro-
cedures, promoted by the cultural authority of science, 
scientism, and metrication. By isolating unacknowledged 
value-laden assumptions and material interests in their ar-
ticulation and/or institution, these practices and discourses 
serve as de-politicizing strategies, which aim at the natural-
ization of particular values, interests, and (unequal) socio-
political relations. In these processes, the rational and mor-
al “sound science” of responsible actors and demands is 
distinguished from the radical epistemically-vacuous con-
cerns of irresponsible actors and demands. This shifts the 
site of struggle from politico-ideological conflict about al-
ternative courses of action to dichotomies such as (sound) 
science vs politics/ideology/fear/emotions/junk science. It 
evacuates a democratic debate between competing, yet 
legitimate actors with competing, yet legitimate demands 
in favor of technocratic decision-making or “free market” 
forces (reproducing the socio-political status-quo). The 
proliferation of “evidence-bases” in different professional 
milieus such as medicine, nutrition, and insurance practic-
es points at the instauration of axes that discriminate be-
tween what is valued and what is not in these practices, 
in other words, between what is recognized as legitimate 
and what is recognized as illegitimate. However, these ex-
amples have simultaneously demonstrated how in these 
socio-technical configurations the political is never closed 
down, since these configurations subsequently become a 
source of re- politicization.
From a perspective of democratic politics, the identifica-
tion of processes of de- and re-politicization constitutes 
an important research agenda for scholars working on 
bio-objects. We call this agenda, “translations of the politi-
cal,” since these processes translate the political differently: 
processes of de-politicization involve the construction of 
specific and new bodies of knowledge such as “evidence-
bases,” which are not directly based on scientific research 
results, but rather on ways to categorize research results in 
such a manner that political decisions can be made and le-
gitimized. De-politicization thus means making the politi-
cal invisible for political purposes. The contingent nature of 
such categorization practices becomes apparent through 
contestation and alternative categorizations in what we 
have called processes of re-politicization. In so doing, we 
align ourselves with recent work of science and technol-
ogy studies (STS) researchers who have sought to bring 
the question of politics in STS research (24,25). Other work 
in this field has drawn on neo-Foucauldian strands of so-
cial theory, which stress the importance of socio-histor-
ical formations like “neo-liberal governmentality” (26,27), 
post-marxist theories like Gramsci’s concept of hegemo-
ny (28), or Marx’s concept of mode of production (29-31). 
The “political turn” we are calling for is to study discourses 
and practices as intertwined elements of the specific so-
cio-technical configurations in which they function. The 
analytical challenge is to understand these context-spe-
cific arrangements in terms of in/excluded, il/legitimate 
ideas and dreams, facts, spokespersons, (bio-)objects, pro-
fessional groups, and forms of knowledge, and to analyze 
their mutual effects in generating the political.
Moreover, bio-objects, as altered or new biological enti-
ties, are particularly hard to categorize. The proliferation 
of genes, proteins, embryonic cells, GMOs, and so on, as 
“living entities” (32) raises multiple problems of catego-
rization, standardization, and framing. The intricacies 
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in coming to terms with “living entities” in legal lawmak-
ing (eg, GMO regulation, patent law and embryo law), and 
in suppressing natural complexity with the mechanisms 
of laws, have been documented (33-35). This difficulty in 
“taming” life itself re-generates political controversy and 
the emergence of concerned groups. With commercial 
interests in mind, bio-objects raise specific stakes when 
it comes to their definition, their categorization, and their 
conditions of diffusion (as in European regulation for ex-
ample). A fundamental issue for this research agenda is 
the empirical exploration of whether bio-objects, as bio-
logical matter “out of place,” generate specific kinds of politi-
cal relations. As pinning down bio-objects in a single legal 
or technical definition is extremely difficult, an important 
question becomes: To what extent can a bio-object be said 
to socially exist, and maintain a fixed identity, given that 
the qualification of the object is precisely what is at stake in 
processes of de- and re-politicization? Essentially, we invite 
our colleagues to explore bio-objects and their capacity to 
generate political relations, in addition to new and conflict-
ing definitions of what a given bio-object is. Because of the 
prevailing de-politicization of debates such as GM crops 
and food in terms of “facts and figures,” we hold that the 
subsequent contestations and re-politicizations should 
not be regarded as obstacles to progress, but as conditions 
for an alternative approach to progress: The question is not 
what kind of technological solutions we “need,” according to 
the latest prospective study, but what kind of society we 
want, according to the bet that different dreams can be 
made to co-exist.
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